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Although significant progress has been made on the 
federal budget, further gains will be more difficult to 
achieve. Since the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings (GRH) 
deficit targets have been in place, federal spending has 
been constrained. Those targets, however, are in grow-
ing conflict with new pressures to spend. One implica-
tion is that the government will work harder to escape 
GRH's grip. Another implication is that actual deficit 
reduction will proceed at a reduced pace. 
The Grip of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings ... 
The government got a grip on the budget in 1985, when 
Congress passed the 1986 budget resolution and the 
subsequent Gramm-Rudman-Hollings deficit-reduction 
act.
1 Based on policies in place before the resolution, 
projections by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) 
showed a steadily rising path of deficits approaching 
$300 billion by fiscal 1990 (see Table 1). However, 
assuming that the policies in the 1986 budget resolution 
were implemented, the CBO projected deficits would 
steadily decline to a bit over $ 100 billion in fiscal 1990. 
The assumption that the policies of the 1986 budget 
resolution would be implemented proved to be a good 
one: it was made good by GRH. A resolution is just a 
plan and by itself does not force action. After the 1986 
budget resolution was passed in August 1985, Congress 
seemed unable to take any action on the budget. That 
changed with GRH, which was signed into law by 
President Reagan in December 1985. 
The law contains two important provisions. The first 
sets out budget deficit targets over a five-year span and 
creates a mechanism to hit them. If projected deficits in 
the next fiscal year exceed the targets by $10 billion, 
then GRH mandates automatic spending cuts to reach 
them. The cuts are to come in equal shares from 
nonprotected defense and nondefense programs. The 
second important provision says that any new spending 
program must be explicitly financed, either by cutting 
existing expenditures or by raising revenues. 
Almost immediately after its passage, GRH forced 
action on the budget. Since Congress had taken no 
action on the 1986 budget resolution, the projected 
deficit for fiscal 1986 exceeded the GRH target. In 
February, GRH forced spending reductions totaling 
$11.7 billion—a sizable cut for half a fiscal year. A few 
months later, the Supreme Court ruled that the original 
GRH was unconstitutional, but the government chose 
to retain the $11.7 billion in spending cuts.
2 
Although the mechanism of GRH has been changed 
lrThe formal name for the budget resolution is the First Concurrent 
Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 1986 and for GRH, the Balanced 
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985. For historical accounts 
of the events surrounding their passage, see Congressional Quarterly 1987 
(pp. 579-80) and West 1988. 
2 After being found unconstitutional, GRH was amended in 1987 to give the 
Office of Management and Budget the responsibility for projecting future 
deficits and making the automatic spending cuts according to a congressional 
formula. The law's two important provisions were retained. 
11 Table 1 
Policy Changes in 1986 Budget Resolution 
as Estimated By CBO in August 1985 
By Fiscal Year and in Billions of Dollars 
CBO CBO 
Projection Extrapolation* 
Item 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
CBO Baseline Deficit 212 229 243 264 285 
(August 1985 Estimates) 
Deficit Reductions 
as Estimated by CBO 
Revenue Increases**  -3  -5  -8  -11  -11 
National Defense  -11  -25  -41  -57  -74 
Entitlements  -7  -13  -18  -19  -20 
Nondefense 
Discretionary  -11  -20  -24  -25  -26 
Offsetting Receipts1"  -4  —  —  -1  -1 
Net Interest  -1  -3  -10  -20  -33 
Total Reductions5  -37  -66  -100  -132  -164 
Deficit in Budget Resolution 
as Estimated by CBO 175 163 143 132 120 
"Although the budget resolution covers only fiscal years 1986-88, its policies are extrapolated 
through 1990. 
"Revenue increases appear as negative numbers because they reduce the deficit. 
^Blanks indicate amounts less than $500 million. 
§ltems may not add to total because of rounding. 
Source: CBO 1985, p.66 
because of the Court's ruling and its targets have been 
raised once, the law has clearly restrained spending. 
This restraint is evidenced by the paucity of new 
spending programs adopted since GRH, the change in 
tenor of congressional discussions, and the attempts by 
Congress to circumvent the GRH targets. Perhaps the 
best evidence of restraint is that the government has 
basically adhered to the policies of the 1986 budget 
resolution—policies that GRH helped enforce. 
Those policies called for the deficit to be reduced 
primarily by constraining spending. That constraint can 
be seen by comparing two projections the CBO made in 
August 1985 (see Table 1). One assumed that the 
policies in place before the 1986 budget resolution 
would continue. The other assumed policies would be 
changed to those in the budget resolution. By fiscal 
1990 the resolution policies were projected to cut the 
deficit by $ 164 billion. Of that amount, only $ 11 billion 
was projected to come from higher revenues; the rest 
was to come from spending cuts, with defense taking 
the largest hit. 
Contrary to some popular accounts, the rising sur-
plus in Social Security trust funds had no effect on the 
turnaround in the deficit picture. That surplus had 
already been taken into account in the CBO's pre-
budget resolution projections, which showed deficits 
rising to $285 billion by fiscal 1990. 
Although the 1986 budget resolution was merely a 
plan, actual policies have not strayed far from it. To 
determine roughly how far, I compare the budget fore-
cast the CBO made in August 1985 assuming the 1986 
budget resolution policies were enacted with actual 
figures and the CBO's recent projections.
3 The fore-
cast errors and revisions, which result from this com-
parison, stem from two root causes: incorrect assump-
tions about economic conditions and incorrect as-
sumptions about policies.
4 If changes in economic 
assumptions account for the bulk of the forecast errors 
and revisions, it follows that actual policies have not 
differed much from those of the 1986 budget resolu-
tion. That is what my analysis concludes. 
Over 1986-88, actual deficits were relatively close 
to those forecasted by the CBO in August 1985, and 
actual economic conditions were close to what the 
CBO had assumed. Over those three fiscal years, actual 
deficits turned out be to $221 billion, $150 billion, and 
$155 billion. The CBO had forecasted deficits of $175 
billion, $163 billion, and $143 billion—or an average 
error of only $ 15 billion per year. Moreover, during the 
1986-88 calendar years, actual economic conditions 
turned out close to what the CBO had assumed. Over 
1986-88, the inflation-adjusted gross national product 
(real GNP) averaged 3.2 percent growth per year and 
90-day Treasury bill rates averaged 6.2 percent. The 
CBO had assumed real GNP growth would average 
3.4 percent and Treasury bill rates would average 7.3 
percent. The recent CBO rules of thumb (shown in 
Table 2) suggest that errors in economic assumptions 
caused the CBO's deficit projections to be no more than 
3Throughout this paper I take the CBO's recent projections to be those 
released in January 1989 (see CBO 1989). More recently, the Wall Street 
Journal reports that the CBO has since revised up its spending and deficit 
projections by about $5 billion per year through fiscal 1992 (Rogers 1989). 
41 do not distinguish between incorrect assumptions about what policies are 
implemented and how policies are translated into spending and revenues, as the 
CBO does; rather, I combine the two into policy differences. 
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Table 2 
Rules of Thumb Showing Effects on CBO Baseline Budget Projections 
of Selected Changes in Economic Assumptions 
By Fiscal Year and in Billions of Dollars 
Indicator Change In 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Real Growth 
Effect of One-Percentage-Point Lower 
Annual Rate Beginning Jan. 1989 
Interest Rates 
Effect of One-Percentage-Point Higher 
Annual Rates Beginning Jan. 1989 
(All Maturities) 
'Items may not add to total because ot rounding. 
Source: CBO 1989, p. 51 
Table 3 
CBO Assumptions for Real Growth and Interest Rates 
By Calendar Year 
Indicator 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Real Gross National Product 3.8 2.9 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.3 
(% Change) 
Three-Month Treasury Bill Rate 6.7 7.9 7.1 6.7 6.4 6.1 5.9 
(%) 
Source: CBO 1989, p.xv 
$8 billion too high in any of those three years.
5 I 
therefore conclude that actual policies in 1986-88 were 
close to those in the budget resolution. 
The CBO's recent deficit projections are higher than 
those forecasted back in 1985, but changes in economic 
assumptions account for the bulk of the difference. 
Over fiscal 1989 and 1990, the CBO's January 1989 
projections call for deficits of $155 billion and $141 
billion. In August 1985 it had forecasted deficits of 
$132 billion and $120 billion—or an average revision 
Revenues  -6  -20  -39  -59  -79  -102 
Outlays  1  4  8  14  22  32 
Deficit*  7  24  48  73  101  134 
Revenues 
Outlays  3  11  16  20  24  29 
Deficit  3  11  16  20  24  29 
of $22 billion. However, changed economic assump-
tions can account for much of this revision. The CBO 
now assumes that in 1989-90, real GNP growth will 
5 As an approximation, the CBO's recent rules of thumb (Table 2) can be 
considered time invariant and linear. Time invariant means, for example, that I 
can substitute t for 1989, t +1 for 1990, and so forth, as long as t is within a 
few years of 1989. Linear means, for example, that we can determine the effects 
of a 2 percentage point increase in real growth by multiplying the appropriate 
entries in Table 2 by -2. To calculate the effects of changes in economic 
assumptions for 1986-88,1 let / = 1986, f + 1 = 1987, and t+2 = 1988. 
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The Government Has Kept Close to the Policies of the 1986 Budget Resolution 
The CBO's August 1985 Projections 
Compared With Actual Data and Recent Projections 
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average 2.5 percent per year and 90-day Treasury bill 
rates will average 7.5 percent (see Table 3). Back in 
1985 the CBO's assumptions were 3.5 percent and 7.2 
percent, respectively. According to the CBO rules of 
thumb (from Table 2), 1 percentage point lower real 
growth and 0.3 percentage point higher interest rates 
can account for an $18 billion average increase in 
deficit projections—the bulk of the actual revisions. So I 
conclude that current policies are close to those in the 
1986 budget resolution as well. 
The government's grip on the budget under GRH 
can also be seen by comparing the CBO projections 
made in August 1985 with actual figures and recent 
CBO projections (see Charts 1-3). Comparing the 
1985 projections with and without the 1986 budget 
resolution policies indicates the extent of deficit reduc-
tion that was planned. Comparing the 1985 projections 
based on the resolution policies with actual figures and 
recent projections indicates the extent of deficit re-
duction achieved. (Because the charts show budgetary 
trends, the data are expressed as percents of GNP to 
account for changes in the scale of the economy.) Chart 
1 shows that the deficit reduction planned by the reso-
lution was essentially accomplished. Chart 2 shows that 
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Chart 4 
Federal Debt Held by the Public 
Is Projected to Grow More Slowly 
Fiscal Years 
Source: CBO 1989 
the sizable reductions planned to expenditures were 
largely achieved. And Chart 3 shows that little change 
was planned to revenues, and little change occurred. 
... Is Loosening 
The budget outlook seems less bright than in the recent 
past because GRH's grip on the budget is loosening. I 
reach this conclusion in a series of steps. First, I review 
recent budget trends and the CBO's recent baseline 
budget projections. Those projections provide one 
characterization of the current budget situation. Next, I 
argue that the current situation is worse than the CBO 
baseline indicates because the baseline does not ade-
quately account for some prior commitments and new 
pressures to spend. Finally, I argue that because the 
current situation is so unfavorable, the government will 
make only a small advance toward the GRH targets. 
Although the government could go further, as it did in 
1985, such progress seems more difficult this time 
around. 
The Current Budget Situation 
• The CBO's View 
Actual figures and the CBO's January 1989 baseline 
projections indicate that a corner has been turned on 
budget policy. Public debt, after rising much faster 
than total income (GNP) over the Reagan years, just 
kept pace with GNP in fiscal 1988 and is expected to 
rise more slowly than GNP through fiscal 1994 (see 
Chart 5 
Spending Restraint and Stable Revenues 
Are Expected to Reduce the Deficit 
Fiscal Years 
Source: CBO 1989 
Chart 4). This turnaround is significant and important: 
A policy that implies a steadily rising debt-to-GNP 
ratio is not sustainable because eventually the cost of 
servicing the debt outstrips the resources available to 
service it. Thus, the turnaround signals that policy has 
shifted to a sustainable course. 
The reason for the relatively slower growth in debt 
is that the CBO expects the deficit to shrink steadily, 
both in absolute terms (from $155 billion in 1989 to 
$122 billion in 1994) and, more dramatically, as a 
share of GNP (see Chart 5). The primary reason for the 
shrinkage is spending restraint; outlays are expected to 
steadily decline as a share of GNP. In contrast, revenues 
as a share of GNP are expected to remain stable at a 
fairly high rate. 
According to the CBO, spending restraint is ex-
pected to be fairly broad-based over the next five years 
(see Charts 6-9). The restraint is due primarily to two 
baseline assumptions. One is that real spending is 
constant on annually appropriated programs. This 
assumption together with a forecast of real economic 
growth (see Table 3) implies a decline in spending 
relative to GNP. The second is that interest rates will 
decline through 1994 (see Table 3). This results in 
declining interest expense relative to GNP. 
Defense spending, after rising relative to GNP in the 
early Reagan years, has slowed and is expected to 
decline relative to GNP through 1994 (see Chart 6). 
The decline follows from the CBO's first primary 
15 Chart 6-9 
Spending Restraint Is Expected to Be Broadly Based 
Outlays by Major Sources 
Chart 6 National Defense 
Fiscal Years 
Chart 7 Entitlements and Other Mandatory Spending 
Fiscal Years 
Source: CBO 1989 
Chart 8 Nondefense Discretionary Spending 
% of GNP 
Fiscal Years 
Chart 9 Net Interest 
% of GNP 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 
Fiscal Years 
assumption, since defense programs are subject to an-
nual appropriations. The decline brings defense spend-
ing as a share of GNP almost down to where it was 
before the Reagan buildup. 
Entitlements and other mandatory spending pro-
grams—such as Social Security, Medicare, and federal 
pensions—are expected to remain stable as a share of 
GNP (see Chart 7). These programs had taken a larger 
and larger share of the pie, rising from 5 percent of 
GNP in fiscal 1966 to 12 percent of GNP in fiscal 1983. 
Since then, however, spending has been more restrained 
and is expected to remain at close to 11 percent of GNP 
through 1994. 
Nondefense discretionary spending has taken a 
shrinking slice of the pie in the 1980s (see Chart 8). 
Grants to state and local governments have received the 
largest cuts. Since programs in this budget category are 
subject to annual appropriations, the CBO's assump-
16 Preston J. Miller 
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Charts 10-12 
Revenues Are Expected to Remain Stable 
Revenues by Major Sources 
Chart 10 Individual Income Taxes 
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tions imply that such spending will shrink further as a 
percent of GNP. 
With smaller deficits and declining interest rates 
assumed, the CBO projects that what had been the 
fastest-growing spending category—net interest ex-
pense—will flatten and then decline as a percent of 
GNP (see Chart 9). The rise in interest expense had 
mirrored the rise in public debt, and its leveling and 
decline reflect a similar pattern in debt. 
While the CBO projects spending to decline, it 
projects revenues to remain stable through 1994 (see 
Charts 10-12). Individual income taxes are expected to 
rise modestly and then stabilize at 9 percent of GNP 
(Chart 10). That share is close to where these taxes 
were in the early 1980s, before tax reform temporarily 
reduced them. 
Social insurance taxes have climbed to become the 
government's second major revenue source, making up 
17 7 percent of GNP (Chart 11). Under current policies, 
the CBO expects social insurance taxes to remain at 7 
percent of GNP. 
All other federal taxes have declined in importance 
as sources of revenue. The largest relative declines have 
come in corporate income taxes and excise taxes. 
Combined, the taxes in this category are projected to 
decline to a little over 3 percent of GNP (see Chart 12). 
In summary, the CBO projects that under current 
policies, the deficit will decline relative to GNP. As 
shares of GNP, outlays are projected to decline, while 
revenues are projected to be flat. Declines relative to 
GNP are projected for defense, nondefense discretion-
ary spending, and net interest expense. 
• A Worse View 
Due to past commitments and new pressures to spend, 
the budget situation seems worse than the one por-
trayed by the CBO's projections. At issue is how best to 
characterize the budget outlook under current policies. 
I have no quarrel with the CBO's economic assump-
tions, which seem entirely reasonable (see Table 3). But 
I doubt that the CBO's baseline convention of holding 
real spending fixed on appropriated programs (and 
some other technical assumptions, such as for the catas-
trophic health care program) adequately accounts for 
past policy commitments and some stated intentions.
6 
The CBO's defense projections assume no real 
growth in defense spending through 1994. That is 
consistent with its assumption for all programs funded 
by annual appropriations. Yet it is estimated that a 4 
percent real increase per year is required to fund current 
defense operations and approved weapons systems 
(Silk 1988). More specifically, the CBO points out that 
its baseline assumptions make no allowance for the 
administration's plan to buy 132 B-2 (Stealth) bombers 
at a cost of about $0.5 billion apiece. Its baseline as-
sumptions also make no allowance for the cleanup and 
modernization of nuclear armaments plants—tasks 
estimated by the Energy Department to cost about $6 
billion per year over the next 20 years. Thus, the CBO's 
baseline projections incorporate large cuts in defense 
spending from what it would be if no operations or 
weapons systems were curtailed. 
The CBO's projections also incorporate restraint on 
spending for the catastrophic health care program—but 
this time it's the public who is expected to show 
restraint. The CBO assumes that the public will not 
increase its demand for expensive health care, such as 
care for the terminally ill, when there is 100 percent 
coverage of expenses (after a moderate deductible). On 
a program structured in this way, expenditures could be 
expected to steadily outstrip static projections and 
insurance premiums to follow up, a step behind expen-
ditures. 
The CBO's projections also ignore pressures for new 
spending, and the costs seem significant. The cost of 
President Bush's kinder, gentler nation—his new initia-
tives for health, education, and other social programs-
is estimated in the Bush budget to be about $7.3 billion 
(President.. ., 1989, p. 181). The cost of bailing out 
the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation 
(FSLIC) under Bush's plan is now estimated by the 
CBO to cost around $ 11 billion per year (Duke 1989), 
but the CBO baseline only allocates $5 billion yearly. 
Moreover, as the CBO points out, its baseline 
assumptions make no allowance for conducting the 
decennial Census of Population, building the manned 
space station or the superconducting super collider, or 
renewing long-term subsidized housing contracts that 
are about to expire (CBO 1989, p. xiii). 
The Budget Outlook 
Even if the current budget situation were not worse than 
the CBO's baseline projections suggest, major policy 
actions would still need to be taken on the budget to 
conform to the GRH targets and avoid triggering 
automatic spending cuts (see Chart 13). 
The actual budget outcome will probably be better 
than what the current budget situation suggests. That is 
because policymakers will take some actions to im-
prove the situation. Baseline projections are conditional 
statements of what will occur if no further policy 
changes are made. To predict what the actual budget 
outcome will be, one then has to predict what policy 
changes will in fact be adopted. 
• Confrontation, Compromise, and Chicanery 
No matter what new budget policies are adopted, the 
complex political process by which they are chosen is 
apt to involve confrontation, compromise, and chi-
canery. Confrontation seems likely, since some strong 
political forces are facing off in the budget process. One 
force, of course, is GRH, which requires the fiscal 1990 
deficit to be brought down to $100 billion and requires 
any new spending programs to be funded explicitly by 
higher revenues. A second force is the Democratic 
Congress, which will attempt to preserve social pro-
grams by asking for further defense cuts and revenue 
6The General Accounting Office reached this same conclusion, according 
to the New York Times (see Tolchin 1988). 
18 Preston J. Miller 
Budget Policy 
Chart 13 
Major Policy Actions Are Needed 
to Reach the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Targets 
CBO Baseline Deficit Projections 
Versus GRH Targets 
Source: CBO 1989 
increases in any deficit-reduction package. A third 
force is the Bush administration, which has promised 
not to cut real defense spending, not to touch Social 
Security, and not to raise taxes.
7 
In the years before GRH, the opposing forces in 
Congress and the administration would have been 
expected to lead to a gridlock on the budget. But that 
can't happen now. If the government can't reach a 
compromise within the limits of GRH, then spending 
will be cut to reach the GRH targets, coming 50-50 
from nonprotected defense and nondefense programs. 
If large cuts were required, neither the administration 
nor Congress would be pleased with the outcome. The 
administration would not like to see large cuts in de-
fense, and Congress would not like to see large cuts in 
social programs. 
Congress and the administration could seek a way 
out by raising the GRH targets, but that outcome seems 
unlikely. The targets were raised once before, and to do 
so again would be to effectively repeal the law. More-
over, public opinion and the financial market's response 
might make such an option unattractive. 
So to stay within the GRH targets, Congress and the 
administration will have to compromise. And the road 
to compromise is likely to involve confrontation. But 
compromise alone is not likely to do the whole job. 
That's where chicanery comes in. The government can 
take fewer real budget-cutting actions by using book-
keeping tricks. These tricks help the reported budget 
meet the GRH targets, but they do nothing to alter the 
budget's claims on private resources. 
The key to the tricks is one special feature of GRH: 
the automatic cuts are based on projected deficits for 
just the next fiscal year. Thus, bookkeeping tricks that 
either move spending increases or tax cuts up into the 
current fiscal year, back into future fiscal years, or off 
the books indefinitely can help the budget hit the GRH 
targets. At least three tricks will be used. 
One trick is to make overly optimistic assumptions 
about the economy. The CBO's recent assumptions pall 
in contrast to the optimistic assumptions proposed by 
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), whose 
projections are used for the GRH budget calculations. 
The OMB assumes real growth will average 3.3 per-
cent per year over 1989 and 1990 (nearly 1 percentage 
point higher than the CBO assumes), while the 90-day 
Treasury bill rate will fall to 5.5 percent in 1990 (over 
1.5 percentage points lower than the CBO assumes). 
The OMB assumptions make the budget look better 
than it really is without changing policy in any way. (To 
see how much better, apply the CBO rules of thumb 
from Table 2.) These assumptions affect the projected 
deficits, which are the target of GRH, but not the actual 
deficits. 
A second trick is to change the timing of expen-
ditures and revenues. The government, for instance, can 
move deficit increases forward. Last February the OMB 
projected a deficit for fiscal 1989 of $ 130 billion, which 
was in accord with the GRH target. That deficit is now 
estimated to be over $160 billion. The government 
could move spending now scheduled for fiscal 1990 up 
into 1989. This would reduce the projected deficit for 
1990 and raise the deficit for 1989. But the 1989 deficit 
is just spilt milk under GRH. 
The government can also move deficit increases 
back into the future. It can finance current spending, 
such as the FSLIC bailout, with off-budget bonds; then 
only the interest on the bonds shows up as spending in 
the budget.
8 Or instead of paying out subsidies directly, 
it can accomplish the same thing with direct loans and 
7 Another force was supposed to be the National Economic Commission, 
which tried to devise a bipartisan plan for deficit reduction but failed. 
8 In fact, according to the administration's plan, such a ploy shows up on the 
budget as a $ 14 billion surplus in fiscal 1989. The bonds sold are off-budget, but 
when the proceeds are turned over to the Treasury they are counted as revenues. 
Since the cost over time to the Treasury is not reduced by this ploy, a surplus in 
the current year implies higher deficits in future years. 
19 loan guarantees. Then the subsidies show up only after 
time, as the expected loan losses actually occur. At the 
end of fiscal 1988 the government had outstanding 
$222 billion in direct loans and $550 billion in guar-
anteed loan commitments (OMB 1989, p. 118). Budget 
experts claim that "the hidden losses embedded in 
the Government's huge portfolio of subsidized loans 
and loan guarantees have reached startlingly high 
levels ... ."
9 
A third trick is to simply move expenditures or 
revenues off budget. The government, for example, 
may favor some form of universal health care. If it were 
to run the program, any payments it made would be 
considered federal expenses and any income it received 
would be considered tax revenue. However, if it were 
simply to require private firms to provide health care 
service to their employees, the program would not be 
included in the federal budget. Yet, in either case, the 
program would make exactly the same claim on private 
resources. 
• Escaping the Grip 
Given the magnitude of the problem—on the order of 
$45 billion in cuts according to the CBO to get to the 
GRH fiscal 1990 target of $100 billion—some real 
actions will have to be taken. One might even argue that 
the outcome may resemble what happened in 1985: 
then the government, faced with a troubling budget 
situation, was able to get a grip on the budget. But there 
are some differences now which make that outcome 
less likely. 
One difference is that in 1985, action was necessary 
to put the budget on a sustainable path. Now projected 
deficits with no change in policy seem sustainable; they 
imply no further increases in debt relative to GNP. The 
problem now is that deficits seem too large for the 
attainment of other economic objectives—such as a 
higher national savings rate or a lower trade deficit—so 
the issue now concerns what is desirable rather than 
what is essential. 
A second difference is that in 1985, cuts were made 
from a rising baseline projection. Now those cuts must 
be made from a flat baseline. It seems easier, for in-
stance, to go from a 4 percent real defense growth 
baseline to zero, as was done in 1985, than to go from 
zero to negative, as would be the case now. 
A third difference is that over the years the govern-
ment has learned ways to escape the grip of GRH. 
When the law was new, the government wasn't aware 
of all the accounting tricks to avoid it, so more real 
action had to be taken. 
Slower Progress Ahead 
Given public sentiment, the government is still likely to 
take some meaningful action on the budget to attempt 
to move toward the GRH targets. But, given the size of 
the problem, actual deficit reduction is likely to be 
slower in the next few years than it was in the last few. 
9Quoted from the New York Times (Nash 1988). The article goes on to 
report that the General Accounting Office has begun auditing the government's 
credit programs. In its first audit, released in December 1988, it found that the 
Farmers Home Administration had "cumulative losses equal to $36 billion on 
its $90 billion of loans and other obligations." 
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